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Abstract
Imaging is a form of probabilistic belief change which could be employed for both revision and update. In this
paper, we propose a new framework for probabilistic belief change based on imaging, called Expected Distance Imag-
ing (EDI). EDI is sufficiently general to define Bayesian conditioning and other forms of imaging previously defined
in the literature. We argue that, and investigate how, EDI can be used for both revision and update. EDI’s definition
depends crucially on a weight function whose properties are studied and whose effect on belief change operations
is analysed. Finally, four EDI instantiations are proposed, two for revision and two for update, and probabilistic
rationality postulates are suggested for their analysis.
1 Introduction
From the perspective of classical (Boolean) belief change, the work of Alchourrón et al. (1985) is regarded as the
foundation theory for belief revision (AGM theory). Typically, belief change (in a static world) can be categorized
as expansion, revision or contraction, and is performed on a belief set, the set of sentences K closed under logical
consequence. Revision is when new information α is (possibly) inconsistent with K and K is (minimally) modified so
that the new K remains consistent and entails α. Revision is the process which takes place when an agent modifies its
beliefs due to receiving new information not previously known or which is more relevant or trustworthy. Except for
the movement of information, the physical world is assumed to be completely unchanging.
Whereas belief revision is considered to take place in a static environment, belief update is thought to be the change
in beliefs which takes place due to a dynamic environment. Update refers to the process of bringing beliefs up to date
precisely because the world has changed and the agent needs a new, ‘matching’ view on the world.
From the perspective of classical (Boolean) belief change, Katsuno and Mendelzon (1992) developed the first
serious theory of update (KM theory). Their theory is different from that of AGM in that their rationality postulates
are derived from the understanding that update occurs in a dynamic environment.
However, simply applying AGM theory for revision and KM theory for update has been (indirectly) challenged
(Friedman and Halpern, 1999; Kern-Isberner, 2001; Nayak, 2011; Lang, 2007). Further, how to categorize a belief
change operator is more challenging when notions of uncertainty are considered, for instance, when using probabilities
and rankings. The very definition of belief revision and belief update become more problematic under notions of
uncertainty.
One kind of probabilistic belief change operation which could potentially ‘relax’ the tension between revision
and update is imaging. David Lewis (1976) first proposed imaging to analyse conditional reasoning in probabilistic
settings, and it has recently been the focus of several works on probabilistic belief change (Ramachandran et al., 2010;
Chhogyal et al., 2014; Rens et al., 2016). Imaging is the approach of moving the belief in worlds possible at one
moment to similar worlds compatible with evidence received at a next moment. In other words, the ‘belief-mass’ is
shifted to the ‘images’ of the worlds currently believed possible, where the images are the worlds related via new
evidence to the currently believed worlds.
One of the main benefits of imaging is that it overcomes the problem with Bayesian conditioning, namely, being
undefined when evidence is inconsistent with current beliefs. Gärdenfors (1988) and Rens et al. (2016) proposed
generalizations of Lewis’s original definition. In this paper we propose a new generalization of imaging – or a family
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of imaging-based belief change operators – and analyse other probabilistic belief change methods with respect to it.
In particular, we propose a version of imaging based on the movement of probability mass weighted by the inverse of
distances between possible worlds.
Whether imaging is applicable to revision or update (or both) is still an open question. Gärdenfors (1988) says
"...the imaging method is a general revision method because it gives nontrivial results when...the new information
to be accommodated...[contradicts the current beliefs]". Chhogyal et al. (2014) explore the use of Lewis imaging as
a means to construct probabilistic belief revision. They present explicit constructions of three candidates strategies
based on imaging and investigate their properties. (Rens et al., 2016) define an imaging operation which relaxes the
unique-closest-world assumption of Lewis imaging, and they provide a method of revising (via imaging) a potentially
infinite set of belief states in a finite procedure. On the other hand, some researchers have considered imaging to be the
probabilistic version of update (Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1992; Dubois and Prade, 1993; Nayak, 2011). Ramachandran
et al. (2010) propose a version of imaging for probabilistic belief erasure. In fact, Lewis (1976) himself never said that
imaging was meant to be interpreted as one or the other. In this paper we continue to investigate the relationship of
imaging to revision and update.
The paper makes four contributions. 1) We define Expected Distance Imaging (EDI) and show how Bayesian
conditioning, Lewis imaging and generalized imaging can be couched as EDI operations. 2) We define four (new)
instantiations of the EDI operation. 3) We define a weight function (as used in EDI), and several properties such a
function might have, and explore which of these properties are satisfied by different instantiations of weight functions
(for different versions of the EDI operator). 4) We propose a set of rationality postulates for probabilistic belief update.
Due to space limitations, all proofs of propositions have been omitted. Please refer to the appendix for the proofs.
2 Background
We shall work with a finitely generated classical propositional logic. Let P be a finite set of n atoms. Formally, a
world w is a unique assignment of truth values to all the atoms in P . There are thus 2n conceivable worlds. An agent
may consider some non-empty subset W of the conceivable worlds; W is called the possible worlds. The classical
notion of satisfaction is used. World w satisfies (is a model of) α is written w α. Let L be all propositional formulae
which can be formed from P and the logical connectives ∧ and ¬, with > abbreviating tautology and ⊥ abbreviating
contradiction. Let β be a sentence in L. Mod(β) denotes the set of models of β. β entails α (denoted β |= α) iff
Mod(β)⊆Mod(α). β is equivalent to α (denoted β≡α) iff Mod(β)=Mod(α).
Often, in the exposition of this paper, a world will be referred to by its truth vector. For instance, if a two-atom
vocabulary is placed in order 〈q,r 〉 and w3 ¬q ∧ r , then w3 may be referred to as 01.
In this work, the basic semantic element of an agent’s beliefs is a probability distribution or a belief state
b = {(w1,p1), (w2,p2), . . . , (wn ,pn)},
where {w1,w2, . . . ,wn}=W and pi is the probability (real number) that wi is the actual world in which the agent is,
with
∑
(w,p)∈b p = 1. For parsimony, let b = 〈p1, . . . ,pn〉 be the probabilities that belief state b assigns to w1, . . . ,wn
where, for instance, 〈w1,w2,w3,w4〉 = 〈11,10,01,00〉, and 〈w1,w2, . . . ,w8〉 = 〈111,110, . . . ,000〉. b(α) abbreviates∑
w∈Mod(α)b(w).
It is not yet universally agreed what belief change means in a probabilistic setting. One school of thought says that
probabilistic expansion (restricted revision) is equivalent to Bayesian conditioning (Gärdenfors (1988, Chap. 5) and
Voorbraak (1999) mention this, but no not necessarily agree with it). This is evidenced by Bayesian conditioning (BC)
being defined only when b(α) 6= 0, thus making BC expansion equivalent to BC revision. In other words, one could
define expansion to be
bBCα= {(w,p) |w ∈W,p = b(w |α),b(α) 6= 0},
where b(w |α) can be defined as b(φw ∧α)/b(α) and φw is a sentence identifying w (i.e., a complete theory for w).
Note that bBCα=; iff b(α)= 0. This implies that BC is ill-defined when b(α)= 0.
We may write b∗α as b∗α so that we can write b∗α(w), where ∗ is an arbitrary belief change operator.
The technique of Lewis imaging for the revision of belief states requires a notion of similarity between worlds. In
fact, he implicitly assumes the availability of a mapping of worlds to a total order ≤w on worlds for every fixed w ∈W .
Let wα be the least α-world with respect to ≤w . That is, wα α and: if w 6α, then wα ≤w w ′′ for all w ′′ ∈Mod(α),
and if w α, then wα =w .
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If we indicate Lewis’s original imaging operation with LI, then his definition can be stated as
bLIα := {(w,p) |w ∈W,p = 0 if w 6α, else p = ∑
w ′∈W,w ′α=w
b(w ′)}.
He calls bLIα the image of b on α. In words, bLIα(w) is zero if w does not model α, but if it does, then w retains all
the probability it had and accrues the probability mass from all the non-α-worlds closest to it. This form of imaging
only shifts probabilities around; no probabilities are magnified or shrunk. The probabilities in bLIα thus sum to 1
without the need for any normalization.
3 Non-unique-closest-world Approaches
Every world having a unique closest α-world is quite a strong requirement. We now mention an approach which
relaxes the uniqueness requirement.
Gärdenfors (1988) describes his generalization of Lewis imaging (which he calls general imaging) as “... instead
of moving all the probability assigned to a world W i by a probability function P to a unique (“closest”) A-world W j ,
when imaging on A, one can introduce the weaker requirement that the probability of W i be distributed among several
A-worlds (that are “equally close”).” If we interpret Gärdenfors’ approach correctly, he does not provide a constructive
method but insists that b#α(α)= 1, where b#α is the image (change) of b on α.
Rens et al. (2016) introduced generalized imaging via a constructive method. It is a particular instance of Gärden-
fors’ general imaging. They use a pseudo-distance measure between worlds, as defined by Lehmann et al. (2001) and
adopted by Chhogyal et al. (2014).
Definition 3.1. A pseudo-distance function d : W ×W → Z satisfies the following four conditions: for all worlds
w,w ′,w ′′ ∈W ,
1. d(w,w ′)≥ 0 (Non-negativity)
2. d(w,w)= 0 (Identity)
3. d(w,w ′)= d(w ′,w) (Symmetry)
4. d(w,w ′)+d(w ′,w ′′)≥ d(w,w ′′) (Triangular
Inequality)
Note that d induces a mapping from worlds to total preorders ≤dw on worlds as follows. w ′ ≤dw w ′′ iff d(w,w ′)≤
d(w,w ′′). Note that conditions 2 and 4 make ≤dw a total preorder, and that adding conditions 1 and 3 do not necessarily
make ≤dw a (total) partial order. This makes it possible for a world to have more than one closest worlds. One may also
want to impose a condition on a distance function such that any two distinct worlds must have some distance between
them: For all w,w ′ ∈W , if w 6=w ′, then d(w,w ′)> 0 (Faithfulness).
Let Min(α,w,d) be the set of α-worlds closest to w with respect to pseudo-distance d . Formally,
Min(α,w,d) := {w ′ α | ∀w ′′ α,d(w ′,w)≤ d(w ′′,w)},
where d(·) is some pseudo-distance measure between worlds (e.g., Hamming or Dalal distance). For instance, using
Hamming distance for d and vocabulary {q,r },
• Min(¬q,11,d)= {01}
• Min(¬q,10,d)= {00}
• Min(¬q,01,d)= {01}
• Min(¬q,00,d)= {00}
Generalized imaging (denoted GI) is defined as
bGIα := {(w,p) |w ∈W,p = 0 if w 6α,else p = ∑
w ′∈W
w∈Min(α,w ′,d)
b(w ′)/|Min(α,w ′,d)|}.
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bGIα is the new belief state produced by taking the generalized image of b on α. In words, the probability mass
of non-α-worlds is shifted to their closest α-worlds, such that if a non-α-world w× with probability p has n closest
α-worlds (equally distant), then each of these closest α-worlds gets p/n mass from w×.
As an example, let belief state b1.0 := 〈1,0,0,0〉 and let belief state b.3/.7 := 〈0.3,0.7,0,0〉 for vocabulary {q,r }. Then
• b0.3/0.7GI¬q(11)= b0.3/0.7GI¬q(10)= 0
• b0.3/0.7GI¬q(01)= 0.3/1+0/1= 0.3
• b0.3/0.7GI¬q(00)= 0.7/1+0/1= 0.7
and
• b1.0GI¬q(11)= b1.0GI¬q(10)= 0
• b1.0GI¬q(01)= 1/1+0/1= 1
• b1.0GI¬q(00)= 0/1+0/1= 0
4 Expected Distance Imaging
In this section, we define expected distance imaging (EDI) and some properties of interest, then we define two in-
stantiations of EDI and define Bayesian conditioning, Lewis imaging and generalized imaging in terms of EDI. Each
operator is considered with respect to the properties. We end with a discussion about the five operations.
4.1 Definition and Properties
Rens and Meyer (2015) proposed determining the new probability of an α-world wα as the weighted average of the
current probabilities of all worlds w ′, where the weights are (inversely) proportional to the distance between wα and
the w ′. The reason for bringing in weights is that the probability of worlds w ′ less (more) similar to the α-world wα
under consideration, should contribute less (more) to the new probability mass of wα. (Distance and similarity are
taken to be inversely proportional in this context.) Building on that idea, we introduce an imaging framework based
on weighted distances. The weight functions are defined in terms of inverse-distance functions, which are defined in
terms of the pseudo-distance function.
First, we introduce potentially inverse-distance functions ιd :W ×W → R and propose considering the following
seven postulates for such functions. For all w,w ′,w ′′,w ′′′ ∈W and all pseudo-distance functions d ,
1. ιd (w,w ′)≥ 0 (Non-negativity)
2. ιd (w,w)= 1 (Identity)
3. ιd (w,w ′)= ιd (w ′,w) (Symmetry)
4. if d(w,w ′)≥ d(w ′′,w ′′′), then ιd (w,w ′)≤ ιd (w ′′,w ′′′) (Weak Inversity)
5. if d(w,w ′)> d(w ′′,w ′′′), then ιd (w,w ′)< ιd (w ′′,w ′′′) (Strict Inversity)
6. if d(w,w ′)= d(w ′′,w ′′′), then ιd (w,w ′)= ιd (w ′′,w ′′′) (Equi-distance).
7. if w 6=w ′, then ιd (w,w ′)< 1 (Faithfulness)
Definition 4.1. A weight function is a function δd : L×W ×W → R. We say that postulate non-negativity, identity,
symmetry, weak inversity, strict inversity, equi-distance or faithfulness is satisfied by δd (α,w,w ′) iff the respective
postulate is satisfied by ιd (w,w ′).
To start off with, weight functions should be in the range [0,1] so as to support the notion of the expectation
of probability. A weight function should thus be non-negative and have a maximum of 1. Moreover, a world’s
probability should carry the maximum weight when compared with itself (identity). Symmetry seems like a very
natural property to expect of a weight function, especially given the close relationship that such functions have with
distance. Weak inversity seems to be the weakest property that promotes some sort of inversity. It would be a useful
distinction to be able to say that a weight function is weakly inverse, but not strictly so. Hence the definition of strict
inversity. Knowing whether the property of equi-distance holds also seems useful and interesting. Note that equi-
distance implies symmetry due to symmetry of the pseudo-distance function, and by logic, equi-distance implies weak
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inversity. Finally, whether a weight function is faithfulness seems like a natural question to ask. And note that identity
together with strict inversity implies faithfulness.
Definition 4.2. Let b be an epistemic state and α a new piece of information. Then the new epistemic state changed
with α via EDI is defined as
bEDIα := {(w,p) | p = 0 if w 6α, else p = 1
γ
∑
w ′∈W
b(w ′)δd (α,w,w ′)},
where γ :=∑w∈Mod(α)∑w ′∈W b(w ′)δd (α,w,w ′) is a normalizing factor.
We may write EDI∗ to indicate that δd is instantiated as δ∗d . For any probabilistic belief change operator ∆, we
say that ∆ is EDI-compatible if and only if there exists a function δ∗d such that b∆α= bEDI∗α for all b and α.
In the rest of the paper, we shall omit the subscript from δd as long is it is clear from the context or unnecessary to
specify for which pseudo-distance function δ is defined.
Definition 4.3. A weight function is an inverse-distance weight function iff it satisfies postulates 1-4 above.
Consider the following three properties a weight function might have.
• ∀α ∈ L,∀w,w ′ ∈W , if w α and w ′ α, then δ(α,w,w ′) 6= 0 (Evidence Relaxation)
• ∀α ∈ L,∀w,w ′ ∈W , if w α and w ′ 6α, then δ(α,w,w ′) 6= 0 (Non-evidence Relaxation)
• ∀α ∈ L,∀w,w ′ ∈W , if w α and w ′ α and w 6=w ′, then δ(α,w,w ′)= 0 (Retention)
(In the following, an α-world is a world satisfying the new evidence α.) We shall call a weight function e-relaxed
iff it satisfies evidence relaxation, and n-e-relaxed iff it satisfies non-evidence relaxation. We shall say that a weight
function is relaxed iff it is both e-relaxed and n-e-relaxed. Later, we shall show how α-worlds ‘share’ their mass with
other α-worlds during the change process if EDI is applied with an e-relaxed weight function. In such operations,
belief mass tends to ‘spread’ among worlds consistent with the same evidence (after repeated change operations).
Bayesian conditioning and the versions of imaging mentioned so far are not like this. In the latter operations, α-worlds
never give up their mass; they are ‘retentive’. The idea captured by the retention condition says that when collecting
probability mass for w (because it is an α world), then do not collect anything from other α worlds. This rule affects
equi-distance, weak and strict inversity. In Section 5.1, the reader will see that n-e-relaxed weight functions are also
useful.
Definition 4.4. The EDI operation is said to be relaxed or retentive iff it satisfies the relaxation, respectively, retention
property.
Observe that a weight functions which satisfy e-relaxation cannot satisfy retention, and vice versa.
4.2 Reciprocal Weights
Rens and Meyer (2015) define the weight to be applied to b(w ′) when determining the new probability of w as
1/d(w,w ′)∑
w ′′∈W,w ′′ 6=w 1/d(w,w ′′)
. It is, however, ill-defined because it is undefined when d(w,w ′)= 0 or d(w,w ′′)= 0 (i.e., when
w =w ′ or w =w ′′).1 We thus adapt their definition based on the reciprocal of distance as follows.
Definition 4.5. δrcp(α,w,w ′) := ηd(w,w ′)+η , for η> 0, where η is a real number.
Because this definition is independent of evidence α, we shall usually omit mentioning the evidence and simply
write δrcp(w,w ′).
In the rest of this section, we use vocabulary {q,r } and let η = 1, unless stated otherwise. Recall that b1.0 :=
〈1,0,0,0〉 and b.3/.7 := 〈0.3,0.7,0,0〉. Two example applications of EDIrcp follow.
Example 4.1.
1Actually, Rens and Meyer (2015) proposed two definitions for weights, one to be applied when “adding worlds” after a belief change and
another when “removing worlds”. In this paper, we use the on for adding worlds.
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• b0.3/0.7EDIrcp¬q(11)= 0
• b0.3/0.7EDIrcp¬q(10)= 0
• b0.3/0.7 EDIrcp¬q(01) = 1γ [0.3δrcp(01,11)+0.7δrcp(01,10)+0δrcp(01,01)+0δrcp(01,00)] = 1γ [0.3× (1/2)+0.7×
(1/3)]= 1γ [0.383¯]= 0.46
• b0.3/0.7 EDIrcp¬q(00) = 1γ [0.3δrcp(00,11)+0.7δrcp(00,10)+0δrcp(00,01)+0δrcp(00,00)] = 1γ [0.3× (1/3)+0.7×
(1/2)]= 1γ [0.45]= 0.54
Example 4.2.
• b1.0EDIrcp¬q(11)= 0
• b1.0EDIrcp¬q(10)= 0
• b1.0EDIrcp¬q(01)= 1γ [1δrcp(01,11)+0δrcp(01,10)+0δrcp(01,01)+0δrcp(01,00)]= 1γ [1× (1/2)]= 1γ [0.5]= 0.6
• b1.0EDIrcp¬q(00)= 1γ [1δrcp(00,11)+0δrcp(00,10)+0δrcp(00,01)+0δrcp(00,00)]= 1γ [1× (1/3)]= 1γ [0.3¯]= 0.4
Proposition 4.1. δrcp is an inverse-distance weight function, and also satisfies strict inversity, equi-distance and
faithfulness, and is relaxed.
Proof. For all w,w ′,w ′′,w ′′′ ∈W :
Non-negativity: d(w,w ′)≥ 0 and η> 0. Thus, δrcp(w,w ′)= η/(d(w,w ′)+η)> 0.
Identity: By the identity constraint of d , d(w,w)= 0 for all w ∈W . Hence, δrcp(w,w)
= η/(d(w,w)+η)= 1.
Inversity: Assume d(w,w ′)> d(w ′′,w ′′′). Then δrcp(w,w ′)= η/(d(w,w ′)+η)< η/(d(w ′′,w ′′′)+η)= δrcp(w ′′,w ′′′).
This implies that δrcp is weakly and strictly inverse.
Equi-distance: Assume d(w,w ′) = d(w ′′,w ′′′). Then δrcp(w,w ′) = η/(d(w,w ′)+ η) = η/(d(w ′′,w ′′′) + η =
δrcp(w ′′,w ′′′).
Symmetry is implied by equi-distance.
Faithfulness: Assume w 6=w ′. Then, by the faithfulness of d , d(w,w ′)> 0. Thus, δrcp(w,w ′)= η/(d(w,w ′)+η)<
1.
For all w,w ′ ∈W , η/(d(w,w ′)+η)> 0. Relaxation (evidence and non-evidence) is thus satisfied.
4.3 Difference Weights
A new definition with a similar meaning follows.It is also inversely proportional to distance. It is based on the differ-
ence between some particular applicable distance and the maximum distance.
Definition 4.6. δdfr(α,w,w ′) := dmax+η−d(w,w ′)dmax+η , for η > 0, where η is a real number and dmax := max{d(w,w ′) |
w,w ′ ∈W }.
Because this definition is independent of evidence α, we shall usually omit mentioning the evidence and simply
write δdfr(w,w ′). Two examples applications of EDIdfr follow.
Example 4.3.
• b0.3/0.7EDIdfr ¬q(11)= 0
• b0.3/0.7EDIdfr ¬q(10)= 0
• b0.3/0.7EDIdfr¬q(01)= 1γ [0.3δdfr(01,11)+0.7δdfr(01,10)+0δdfr(01,01)+0δdfr(01,00)]= 1γ [0.3×(3−d(01,11))/3+
0.7× (3−d(01,10))/3]= 1γ [0.3× (2/3)+0.7× (1/3)]= 1γ [0.43¯]= 0.43¯
• b0.3/0.7 EDIdfr ¬q(00) = 1γ [0.3δdfr(00,11)+ 0.7δdfr(00,10)+ 0δdfr(00,01)+ 0δdfr(00,00)] = 1γ [0.3× (1/3)+ 0.7×
(2/3)]= 1γ [0.56¯]= 0.56¯
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Example 4.4.
• b1.0EDIdfr ¬q(11)= 0
• b1.0EDIdfr ¬q(10)= 0
• b1.0EDIdfr¬q(01)= 1γ [1δdfr(01,11)+0δdfr(01,10)+0δdfr(01,01)+0δdfr(01,00)]= 1γ [1×(3−d(01,11))/3]= 1γ [1×
(2/3)]= 0.6¯
• b1.0EDIdfr ¬q(00)= 1γ [1δdfr(00,11)+0δdfr(00,10)+0δdfr(00,01)+0δdfr(00,00)]= 1γ [1× (1/3)]= 0.3¯
If η were allowed to equal zero, there would be cases when EDI-belief-change is undefined for δ instantiated as
δdfr . For instance, suppose b(10) = 1 and the evidence is ¬q ∧ r . Using Hamming distance for d , δdfr(01,10) = 0.
Hence, bEDI¬q∧r (01)= 1γ [0+b(10)δdfr(01,10)+0+0]= 1γ0, which is undefined because γ= 0. But as soon as η> 0,
δdfr(01,10)> 0 and b EDI¬q ∧ r (01)= 1.
Proposition 4.2. δdfr is an inverse-distance weight function, and also satisfies strict inversity, equi-distance and
faithfulness, and is relaxed.
Proof. For all w,w ′,w ′′,w ′′′ ∈W :
Non-negativity: By the definition of dmax, dmax+η−d(w,w ′)≥ 0, for all w,w ′ ∈W . And due to the faithfulness
condition of the pseudo-distance function, dmax > 0. Thus, dmax+η−d(w,w ′)dmax+η ≥ 0.
Identity: By the identity constraint of d , d(w,w)= 0 for all w ∈W . Hence, dmax+η−d(w,w)dmax+η = 1.
Equi-distance: Assume d(w,w ′)= d(w ′′,w ′′′). Then dmax+η−d(w,w ′)dmax+η =
dmax+η−d(w ′′,w ′′′)
dmax+η .
Symmetry is implied by equi-distance.
Inversity: Assume d(w,w ′) > d(w ′′,w ′′′). Then δdfr(w,w ′) = dmax+η−d(w,w ′)dmax+η <
dmax+η−d(w ′′,w ′′′)
dmax+η = δdfr(w ′′,w ′′′).
This implies that δdfr is weakly and strictly inverse.
Faithfulness: Assume w 6=w ′. Then, by the faithfulness of d , d(w,w ′)> 0. Thus, δdfr(w,w ′)= dmax+η−d(w,w ′)dmax+η < 1.
For all w,w ′ ∈W , dmax+η−d(w,w)> 0. Relaxation (evidence and non-evidence) is thus satisfied.
4.4 Bayesian Conditioning i.t.o. EDI
Bayesian conditioning can be nicely simulated as an EDI operator. Let δBC be defined as follows.
δBC(α,w,w ′) :=
{
1 if w =w ′
0 otherwise
Because the definition of δBC is independent of evidence α, we shall usually omit mentioning the evidence and simply
write δBC(w,w ′).
Proposition 4.3. bBCα= bEDIBCα iff b(α)> 0. That is, BC is EDI-compatible iff b(α)> 0.
Proof.
bBCα(w)= b(w,α)
b(α)
,b(α)> 0
=
{
0 if w 6α
b(w)
b(α) otherwise
=
{
0 if w 6α
1
γb(w) otherwise, where γ= b(α)
=
{
0 if w 6α
1
γ
∑
w ′∈W b(w ′)δBC(w,w ′) otherwise,
where γ= ∑
w∈Mod(α)
∑
w ′∈W
b(w ′)δBC(w,w ′)
implying that bBCα= {(w,p) | p = 0 if w 6α, else p = 1γ
∑
w ′∈W b(w ′)δBC(w,w ′)}= bEDIBCα, for b(α)> 0.
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Proposition 4.4. δBC is an inverse-distance weight function satisfying equi-distance, symmetry, retention and faith-
fulness, but not strict inversity.
Proof. For all w,w ′,w ′′,w ′′′ ∈W :
Clearly, δBC(w,w ′) is non-negative.
Identity follows directly from the definition.
Weak Inversity: Assume d(w,w ′)> d(w ′′,w ′′′). There are two cases to consider: Either d(w,w ′)> d(w ′′,w ′′′)= 0
or d(w,w ′) > d(w ′′,w ′′′) 6= 0. Assume d(w,w ′) > d(w ′′,w ′′′) = 0. Then w ′′ = w ′′′ and w 6= w ′, in which case,
0 = δBC(w,w ′) < δBC(w ′′,w ′′′) = 1. Now assume d(w,w ′) > d(w ′′,w ′′′) 6= 0. Then w ′′ 6= w ′′′ and w 6= w ′, in which
case, δBC(w,w ′)= δBC(w ′′,w ′′′)= 0. By combining the two cases, one sees that the desired result follows. δBC is thus
an inverse-distance weight function.
Equi-distance: Assume d(w,w ′)= d(w ′′,w ′′′). There are two cases to consider: Either d(w,w ′)= d(w ′′,w ′′′)= 0
or d(w,w ′) = d(w ′′,w ′′′) 6= 0. Assume d(w,w ′) = d(w ′′,w ′′′) = 0. Then w = w ′ and w ′′ = w ′′′, in which case,
δBC(w,w ′)= δBC(w ′′,w ′′′) = 1. Now assume d(w,w ′)= d(w ′′,w ′′′) 6= 0. Then w 6=w ′ and w ′′ 6=w ′′′, in which case,
δBC(w,w ′)= δBC(w ′′,w ′′′)= 0.
Symmetry is implied by equi-distance.
Faithfulness follows directly from the definition.
Assume again that d(w,w ′)> d(w ′′,w ′′′) 6= 0. Then w ′′ 6=w ′′′ and w 6=w ′, in which case, δBC(w,w ′) =
δBC(w ′′,w ′′′)= 0. Thus strict inversity does not hold.
Proposition 4.5. δBC is retentive.
Proof. For all w,w ′,w ′′,w ′′′ ∈W :
Assume w α and w ′ α and w 6=w ′. Then, immediately, by the definition of δBC , δBC(w,w ′)= 0.
4.5 Lewis Imaging i.t.o. EDI
Lewis imaging can be simulated as an EDI operator, but not as cleanly as BC. Let δLI be defined as follows.
δLI (α,w,w ′) :=

x if w 6α
1 if w ∈Min(α,w ′,dLI )
0 otherwise,
where x is fixed between 0 and 1, inclusive, and pseudo-distance function dLI induces a mapping from worlds to total
orders (instead of the weaker total pre-orders).
Proposition 4.6. bLIα= bEDILI α. That is, LI is EDI-compatible.
Proof. Let w 6α. Then, independent of the definition of δLI , bLIα(w)= bEDILI α(w)= 0.
Now let w α. Then,
bLIα(w) = ∑
w ′∈W
w ′α=w
b(w ′)
= ∑
w ′∈W
b(w ′)δLI−(w,w ′),
where
δLI−(w,w ′) :=
{
1 if w ′α =w
0 otherwise
=
{
1 if w ∈Min(α,w ′,dLI )
0 otherwise
Noting that the first line of the definition of δLI is applicable only if w 6 α, then the result follows when combining
the cases when w 6α and w α.
Whereas Proposition 4.6 says that there exists a weight function for simulating Lewis imaging with EDI, Proposi-
tion 4.7 says that the function cannot be inverse-distance.
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Proposition 4.7. There exists no inverse-distance weight function δ∗ for which bLIα= bEDI∗α.
Proof. We provide an example for which weak inversity must fail. δLI is thus not an inverse-distance weight function
for this example, nor in general.
Recall that dLI is such that for every α, for each of the worlds, a unique closest α-world can be identified.
Observe that EDILI is retentive: Recall the retention property: if w α and w ′ α and w 6=w ′, then δLI (α,w,w ′)=
0. Directly, the first line of the definition of δLI is not applicable, and it is impossible for w ∈Min(α,w ′,dLI ) and
w ′ α and w 6=w ′, making the second line inapplicable. Only the third line is applicable, and retention thus holds.
Now let dLI (w,w ′)= dLI (w ′′,w ′′′). And let w,w ′′,w ′′′ α. Then Min(w,α,dLI )= {w},
Min(w ′′,α,dLI ) = {w ′′}, Min(w ′′′,α,dLI ) = {w ′′′} and let Min(w ′,α,dLI ) = {w}. Note that δLI(α,w,w ′) must equal 1
(second line of definition) and by retention, δLI (α,w ′′,w ′′′)= 0. Therefore, dLI (w,w ′)
≥ dLI (w ′′,w ′′′), but δLI (α,w,w ′) 6≤ δLI (α,w ′′,w ′′′).
Proposition 4.8. δLI is retentive.
Proof. Assume w,w ′  α and w 6= w ′. Only the second and third lines of the definition of δLI are applicable. We
know that whenever w ′′ α, then Min(w ′′,α,dLI )= {w ′′}. Hence, due to w 6=w ′, the second line cannot be applicable.
Therefore, δLI (α,w,w ′)= 0.
4.6 Generalized Imaging i.t.o. EDI
Generalized imaging can be simulated as an EDI operator, and where LI is always retentive, GI is only retentive under
a reasonable condition. Let δGI be defined as follows.
δGI (α,w,w ′) :=

1 if w =w ′ and w 6α
1/|Min(α,w ′,d)| if w ∈Min(α,w ′,d)
0 otherwise
Proposition 4.9. bGIα= bEDIGI α. That is, GI is EDI-compatible.
Proof. Let w 6α. Then, independent of the definition of δGI , bGIα(w)= bEDIGI α(w)= 0.
Now let w α. Then,
bGIα(w) = ∑
w ′∈W
w∈Min(α,w ′,d)
b(w ′)/|Min(α,w ′,d)|
= ∑
w ′∈W
b(w ′)δGI−(w,w ′),
where
δGI−(w,w ′) :=
{
1/|Min(α,w ′,d)| if w ∈Min(α,w ′,d)
0 otherwise
Noting that the first line of the definition of δGI is applicable only if w 6 α, then the result follows when combining
the cases when w 6α and w α.
For example, the reader can confirm that b0.3/0.7GI¬q = b0.3/0.7EDIGI ¬q and b1.0GI¬q = b1.0EDIGI ¬q .
Whereas Proposition 4.9 says that there exists a weight function for simulating generalized imaging with EDI,
Proposition 4.10 says that the function cannot be inverse-distance.
Proposition 4.10. There exists no inverse-distance weight function δ∗ for which bGIα= bEDI∗α.
Proof. Lewis imaging is a specialization of generalized imaging. The proposition is thus entailed by Proposition 4.7.
Lemma 4.1. Let w α. Then, ∀w ∈W,Min(w,α,d)= {w} iff d is faithful.
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Proof. Recall that Min(α,w,d)= {w ′ α | ∀w ′′ α,d(w ′,w)≤ d(w ′′,w)}.
Assume d is faithful. Then for all w,w ′ ∈W , if w 6=w ′, then d(w,w ′)> 0. By identity of d , d(w,w)= 0. Hence,
Min(w,α,d)= {w}.
Assume d is not faithful. Then there exists a pair of worlds w,w ′ ∈W , such that if w 6= w ′, then d(w,w ′) = 0.
Hence, {w,w ′}⊆Min(w,α,d). Therefore, it is not the case that Min(w,α,d)= {w}.
Proposition 4.11. δGId is retentive iff d is faithful.
Proof. Assume d is faithful. Assume w,w ′ α and w 6=w ′. Only the second and third lines of the definition of δGI
are potentially applicable. By Lemma 4.1, we know that whenever w α, then Min(w ′,α,d)= {w} such that w =w ′.
Hence, due to our assumption that w 6=w ′, the second line cannot be applicable. Therefore, δGI (α,w,w ′)= 0.
Assume d is not faithful. Assume w,w ′  α and w 6= w ′. Only the second and third lines of the definition of
δGI are potentially applicable. By Lemma 4.1, we know that whenever w α, then {w,w ′}⊆Min(w ′,α,d) such that
w 6= w ′. Hence, due to our assumption that w 6= w ′, the second line might be applicable. Therefore, it could be that
δGI (α,w,w ′)= 1/|Min(α,w ′,d)> 0.
Faithfulness is a reasonable property to expect of a distance function. δGId is thus retentive under reasonable
conditions.
4.7 Discussion
To summarize, δrcp and δdfr are relaxed, and δBC and δLI are retentive, and δGI is retentive iff the associated pseudo-
distance function is faithful.
Let δrlx be δrcp or δdfr . Let α be a particular piece of evidence and bt the belief state resulting from the t-th
repeated application of EDIrlx on the resulting belief states for α. That is, b1 = bEDIrlxα, b2 = b1EDIrlxα, and so
on. By running multiple experiments on a computer, we noticed that, as t increases, bt settles on a particular belief
state, that is, bt−1 ≈ bt . (Belief states had eight worlds.) We ran 100 trials for each of the four combinations of
choices for δrlx and η = 1 or η = 0.0001. For each trial, an initial belief state and evidence was chosen randomly.
α ≡ > and α ≡ ⊥ were ignored. Per trial, operation EDI was applied to the resulting belief state ten times with the
α selected for that trial. The difference between the probabilities of a world at successive applications of EDI were
recorded, and the difference of all worlds averaged. See Figure 1. The figure shows the average for the 100 trials of
the average difference at each application of the change operation. Note how the differences asymptotically decrease.
Note that these results do not imply that belief states become uniform distributions over α-worlds. In fact, distributions
are typically not uniform; distributions seem to be dictated by the mutual reinforcement of α-world probabilities and
their corresponding distances from each other. However, whenever exactly two worlds model α, the probability is
eventually divided exactly (uniformly) between the two worlds.
Proposition 4.12. Let α be a particular piece of evidence and bt the belief state resulting from the t-th repeated
application of EDIrtv on the resulting belief states for α, where δrtv is a retentive inverse-distance weight function.
That is, b1 = bEDIrtvα, b2 = b1EDIrtvα, and so on. Then bt = b1 for all t > 1.
Proof. By definition of EDIrtv, if w 6 α, then b1(w) = 0, that is, if b1(w) > 0, then w  α. Therefore, we are only
interested in the potential change in probability of α-worlds. Hence, we consider only δrtv(w,w ′) such that w  α.
And because w ′ contributes no mass to w if w ′ 6 α, we consider only δrtv(w,w ′) such that w,w ′  α. Then by
retention and identity of an inverse-distance weight function, δrtv(w,w ′)= 1 iff w =w ′, else it equals 0. Hence, for all
w α, bt (w)=∑w ′∈W bt−1(w ′)δrtv(w,w ′)= bt−1(w) for all t > 1.
The difference between retention and relaxation seems important, from the perspective of (formal) epistemology.
Suppose w1  α and w2  β have probabilities 0.4, respectively, 0.6. Now if α∧β is successively observed, then
according to, for instance, Bayesian conditioning and Lewis imaging, the probabilities of w1 and w2 will not change.
We argue that there are situations when their probabilities should be allowed to change. One could argue that if α
and β are always observed together, then the probabilities of w1 and w2 should become equal. To put it differently,
the fact that the same information is continually received should make a difference to the spread of the likelihood
of the constituent parts (atoms) of the information. Nonetheless, information received in a static environment has a
different flavor to information received in a dynamic environment (giving rise to belief revision, resp., belief update):
Repeated observation of the same piece of information α′ should not change beliefs therein, beyond the first revision.
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Figure 1: The averages of the differences in probability distributions per belief change operation. Results are the
averages of 100 randomly generated cases.
The first in the series of observations revises beliefs, but subsequent observations of α′ have no effect because it is
‘old news’/already learnt. In this sense, revision corresponds to retentive belief change. On the other hand, when the
same signal is observed in the environment, every new observation is a further confirmation of the truth of α′, thus
modifying one’s belief in the atoms of α′ with every new observation instance (of the same α′). In this sense, update
corresponds to evidence-relaxed belief change.
5 EDI for Revision vs. EDI for Update
In this section, we couch all belief change operations as EDI. For each of revision and update, EDI will be specialized
into two proposed definitions. One of the specializations in each case will have the following pattern: Apply the
classical operation to determine the newly believed worlds, and then use EDI to determine a probability distribution
over them. The other specialization in each case will be a more direct use of EDI. We shall also check, for each of the
four operations, which properties the corresponding weight function satisfies. We end this section with a discussion of
what it takes to translate classical belief change as EDI in terms of uniform probability distributions.
Katsuno and Mendelzon (1992) use an example involving a room with a table, a book and a magazine in it to
illustrate the difference between revision and update. Suppose we only know that either the book is on the table or
the magazine is on the table, but not both. Let book mean the book is on the floor and mag mean the magazine
is on the floor. Then our belief state can reasonably be represented as b = 〈0,0.5,0.5,0〉, that is b(book∧¬mag) =
b(¬book∧mag)= 0.5 and b(book∧mag)= b(¬book∧¬mag)= 0. Katsuno and Mendelzon (1992) argued that after
revision with book, one should believe book∧¬mag. We thus want
bEDI◦book= 〈0,1,0,0〉,
where ◦ indicates revision. And they argued that after update with book, one should believe book. We thus want
bEDI¦ book= 〈0.5,0.5,0,0〉,
where ¦ indicates update. This is the case when ◦ is BC, and when ¦ is rcp or dfr after an infinite number of EDI¦
with book. However, in this example, b(book) > 0. The question is, What should probabilistic revision (and update)
correspond to when b(book) = 0? For instance, what if α = book↔mag, given the agent currently believes book↔
¬mag? Furthermore, we would like the same operation to be applicable whether or not the evidence contradicts
current beliefs.
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5.1 Probabilistic Revision via Classical Revision
This approach is to determine the new knowledge base exactly as one would in classical belief revision, and then to
assign probabilities to the newly believed worlds.
Let
W b := {w ∈W | (w,p) ∈ b,p 6= 0}.
Let ψb be a sentence modeled by all worlds in W b and no other worlds. Let δàClsRev be defined as follows.
δ
àClsRev(α,w,w ′) :=

1 if w =w ′
δ(α,w,w ′) if w ∈Mod(ψb ◦α)
0 otherwise,
where ◦ is some (acceptable) revision operator and δ is a retentive inverse-distance weight function.
Unfortunately, δàClsRev is not well defined, because bEDIàClsRevα might not be a belief state. For example, suppose
there are four worlds w1, w2, w3 and w4, where b(w1) = 1 and only w4  α (w1,w2,w3 6 α). Let δ be an inverse-
distance weight function such that δ(α,w1,w4) = δ(α,w4,w1) = 0. Then, intuitively, we want bEDIàClsRevα(w4) =
1. By definition, bEDIàClsRevα(wi ) = 0 for i = 1,2,3. We know that Mod(ψb ◦α) = Mod(α) = {w4}. To compute
bEDI
àClsRevα(w4), the second line of the definition of δàClsRev is applicable, hence,
bEDI
àClsRevα(w4) = 1
γ
∑
w ′∈W
b(w ′)δ(α,w4,w ′)
= 1
γ
(
b(w1)δ(α,w4,w1)+b(w2)δ(α,w4,w2)+b(w3)δ(α,w4,w3)+b(w4)δ(α,w4,w4)
)
= 1
γ
(
1×0+0×?+0×?+0×?).
This problem would not occur if δ(α,w1,w4)= 0 were not allowed. We thus define δClsRev as
δClsRev(α,w,w ′) :=

1 if w =w ′
δ(α,w,w ′) if w ∈Mod(ψb ◦α)
0 otherwise,
where ◦ is some (acceptable) revision operator and δ is a non-evidence (n-e-) relaxed and retentive inverse-distance
weight function.
Proposition 5.1. δClsRev is retentive.
Proof. Assume w,w ′ α and w 6=w ′. Then only the second and third lines of the definition of δClsRev are applicable.
If w 6∈Mod(ψb ◦α), then the third line would be applicable, making δClsRev(α,w,w ′) = 0. Thus, the proposition’s
veracity depends only on the value of δ(α,w,w ′). And due to the condition (“if w,w ′  α and w 6= w ′”) in the first
line of the definition of δ, δClsRev(α,w,w ′) = δ′(α,w,w ′) = 0.
Proposition 5.2. δClsRev satisfies non-negativity and identity.
Proof. Non-negativity and identity follow directly from the definition of δClsRev.
Proposition 5.3. δClsRev does not satisfy symmetry, weak inversity, strong inversity nor equi-distance.
Proof. Suppose the vocabulary has three atoms, the distance function is Hamming and
δ(α,w,w ′) :=
{
0 if w,w ′ α and w 6=w ′
δrcp(α,w,w ′) otherwise,
with η = 1. Note that δ is an n-e-relaxed and retentive inverse-distance weight function. Assume Mod(ψb) =
{101,001,000} and 111,110,011,010  α and all other worlds do not model α. Finally, assume that ◦ is defined
such that Mod(ψb ◦α)= {111,011,010}. Note that Mod(ψb ◦α)⊆Mod(α).
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Then d(010,000)= d(110,010)= 1, δClsRev(α,010,000) = δ(α,010,000) = δrcp(α,010,000) = 1/2 and
δClsRev(α,110,010)= 0. Therefore, d(010,000)≥ d(110,010), but δClsRev(α,010,000) 6≤
δClsRev(α,110,010). Hence, weak inversity fails for δClsRev. This case also proves that equi-distance fails.
Due to strict inversity implying weak inversity, by contraposition, strict inversity fails.
To check symmetry, observe that δClsRev(α,000,010)= 0 because 000 6= 010 and 000 6∈Mod(ψb ◦α). But as we see
above, δClsRev(α,010,000)= 1/2. Thus, symmetry fails.
Corollary 5.1. Because δClsRev is not symmetric or weakly inverse, it is not an inverse-distance weight function.
Proposition 5.4. δClsRev is faithful iff δ is.
Proof. Assume w 6=w ′.
Assume δ is not faithful. It could thus happen that δ(α,w,w ′)= 1. Next, assume that w ∈Mod(ψb ◦α) and w ′ 6α,
implying that δClsRev(α,w,w ′)= δ(α,w,w ′). Hence, δClsRev is not faithful.
Now assume δ is faithful. Only the second and third lines are applicable. In both cases,
δClsRev(α,w,w ′) < 1 (particularly, δ(α,w,w ′)< 1, becausew 6=w ′).
5.2 Probabilistic Revision with EDI Directly
The approach here is that revision should satisfy the retentive property. Let
δ=0(α,w,w ′) :=

1 if w =w ′
δ(α,w,w ′) if w 6α or w ′ 6α, else
0 otherwise
where δ is an inverse-distance weight function. Note that δ=0(α,w,w ′)= 0 whenever w,w ′ α and w 6=w ′ (retention).
Proposition 5.5. δ=0(α,w,w ′)= 0 does not satisfy weak inversity.
Proof. Assume d(w,w ′) = d(w ′′,w ′′′) 6= 0. Then, by the identity condition of d , w 6= w ′ and w ′′ 6= w ′′′. Assume
w ′ 6 α, and w ′′,w ′′′  α. Then δ=0(α,w,w ′) = δ(α,w,w ′) and δ=0(α,w ′′,w ′′′) = 0. Now it could happen that
δ(α,w,w ′)> 0, in which case, d(w,w ′)≥ d(w ′′,w ′′′), but δ=0(α,w,w ′) 6≤ δ=0(α,w ′′,w ′′′).
δ=0 does not work as desired when b(α)> 0 (δ is instantiated as δdfr and η= 1):
bEDI
=0
book (11) =
1
γ
[
b(10)δ=0(α,11,10)+
b(01)δ=0(α,11,01)
]
= 1
γ
[
0.5×0+0.5× 2+1−1
2+1
]
= 1
γ
[2
3
]
= 0.5
bEDI
=0
book (10) =
1
γ
[
b(10)δ=0(α,10,10)+
b(01)δ=0(α,10,01)
]
= 1
γ
[
0.5×1+0.5× 2+1−2
2+1
]
= 1
γ
[2
3
]
= 0.5
We thus propose to use δDctRev in general for probabilistic belief revision:
δDctRev(α,w,w ′) :=
{
δBC(w,w ′) if b(α)> 0
δ=0(α,w,w ′) otherwise
The following definition is derived from the one above.
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Definition 5.1.
δDctRev(α,w,w ′) :=
{
δBC(w,w ′) if b(α)> 0
δ=0(α,w,w ′) otherwise
where δ is a non-evidence (n-e-) relaxed and an inverse-distance weight function.
The reason why δ is n-e-relaxed is similar to the reason why δ of δClsRev is. Recall that b(book) 6= 0. Then
bEDI
DctRev
book (11) =
1
γ
[
b(10)δDctRev(α,11,10)+
b(01)δDctRev(α,11,01)
]
= 1
γ
[
0.5×0+0.5×0
]
= 0
bEDI
DctRev
book (10) =
1
γ
[
b(10)δDctRev(α,10,10)+
b(01)δDctRev(α,10,01)
]
= 1
γ
[
0.5×1+0.5×0
]
= 1
And EDIDctRev can also be used in cases where b(α)= 0: Let b = 〈0.3,0.7,0,0〉 and let α=¬book. Observe that α
contradicts the agent’s current belief state b. Let
δ(α,w,w ′) :=
{
0 if w,w ′ α and w 6=w ′
δdfr(α,w,w ′) otherwise,
with η= 0.1. Note that δ is an n-e-relaxed and retentive inverse-distance weight function.
bEDI
DctRev
¬book (01) =
1
γ
[
b(11)δDctRev(α,01,11)+
b(10)δDctRev(α,01,10)
]
= 1
γ
[
0.3δdfr(01,11)+0.7δdfr(01,10)
]
= 1
γ
[
0.3
2.1−1
2.1
+0.72.1−2
2.1
]
= 1
γ
[
0.16+0.03
]
= 0.3¯
bEDI
DctRev
¬book (00) =
1
γ
[
b(11)δDctRev(α,00,11)+
b(10)δDctRev(α,00,10)
]
= 1
γ
[
0.3δdfr(00,11)+0.7δdfr(00,10)
]
= 1
γ
[
0.3
2.1−2
2.1
+0.72.1−1
2.1
]
= 1
γ
[
0.01+0.37
]
= 0.6¯
Initially, the agent is certain that the book is on the floor and there is a relatively high likelihood (0.7) that the magazine
is on the table. Then the agent hears from a reliable source that actually the book is definitely on the table. The agent
revises its beliefs accordingly, and reasonably still believes to a relatively high degree (0.6¯) that the magazine is on the
table.
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Proposition 5.6. δDctRev is retentive.
Proof. Assume w,w ′  α and w 6= w ′. Assume b(α) = 0. Then only the second line of the definition of δDctRev is
applicable. That is, δDctRev = 0. Now assume b(α) 6= 0. Again, only the second line is applicable, making δDctRev = 0.
The retention property is thus satisfied.
Proposition 5.7. δDctRev satisfies non-negativity, identity and symmetry.
Proof. Non-negativity follows directly. If w = w ′, then only the first and third lines are applicable. In both cases,
identity holds.
The first line of the definition is satisfied for δDctRev(α,w,w ′) iff it is satisfied for δDctRev(α,w ′,w). Similarly for
the second line. Because δ is assumed to be an inverse-distance weight function, δ is symmetrical. It thus follows that
δDctRev satisfies symmetry.
Proposition 5.8. δDctRev does not satisfy weak inversity, strict inversity nor equi-distance.
Proof. For all w,w ′,w ′′,w ′′′ ∈W :
Assume d(w,w ′) = d(w ′′,w ′′′). If d(w,w ′) = d(w ′′,w ′′′) 6= 0, then, by the identity condition of d , w 6= w ′ and
w ′′ 6= w ′′′, and only the second and third lines are applicable. Assume “w ′′,w ′′′  α if b(α) = 0” holds, but that
“w,w ′  α if b(α) = 0” does not hold. Then δDctRev(α,w,w ′) = δ(α,w,w ′) and δDctRev(α,w ′′,w ′′′) = 0. Now, it
could be that δ(α,w,w ′) > 0. Hence, if d(w,w ′) ≥ d(w ′′,w ′′′) it is not in general the case that δDctRev(α,w,w ′) ≤
δDctRev(α,w ′′,w ′′′). Thus, weak inversity fails. This case also shows that equi-distance and strict inversity fail.
Proposition 5.9. δDctRev is faithful iff δ is.
Proof. Assume w 6=w ′.
Assume δ is not faithful. Assume b(α)= 0 and w ′ 6α. Then only the third line is applicable. It could happen that
δ(α,w,w ′)= 1, making δDctRev(α,w,w ′)= 1, making δDctRev unfaithful.
Now assume δ is faithful. Only the second and third lines are applicable. In both cases,
δDctRev(α,w,w ′) < 1 (particularly, δ(α,w,w ′)< 1, because w 6=w ′).
5.3 Probabilistic Update via Classical Update
This approach is the same as we took for probabilistic revision via classical revision; to determine the new knowledge
base exactly as one would in classical belief update, and then to assign probabilities to the newly believed worlds.
Recall that W b := {w ∈W | (w,p) ∈ b,p 6= 0} and ψb is a sentence modeled by all worlds in W b and no others. Let
δClsUpd be defined as follows.
δClsUpd(α,w,w ′) :=

1 if w =w ′
δ(α,w,w ′) if w ∈Mod(ψb ¦α)
0 otherwise,
where ¦ is some (acceptable) update operator and δ is a relaxed inverse-distance weight function.
Proposition 5.10. If Mod(ψb ¦α)=Mod(α), then δClsUpd is relaxed.
Proof. Assume Mod(ψb ¦α)=Mod(α). Assume w α. If w =w ′, then only the first line of the definition of δClsUpd
is applicable, and δClsUpd(α,w,w ′) 6= 0. If w 6= w ′, then only the second and third lines are applicable. But actually,
by the two assumptions, only the second line is applicable. This implies that for all w,w ′ ∈ W , if w  α, then
δClsUpd(α,w,w ′) 6= 0. Therefore, δClsUpd is relaxed.
Proposition 5.11. δClsUpd satisfies non-negativity, identity and symmetry.
Proof. Non-negativity and identity follow directly from the definition of δClsUpd. We look at the three cases (lines)
which make up the definition of δClsUpd. If w =w ′, then δClsUpd(α,w,w ′)= δClsRev(α,w ′,w)= 1. If w ∈Mod(ψb ¦α),
then δClsUpd(α,w,w ′)= δ(α,w,w ′). But δ(α,w,w ′) is assumed to be an inverse-distance weight function, which im-
plies that δ(α,w,w ′) is symmetrical. For all other cases (third line), it must be that δClsUpd(α,w,w ′)= δClsUpd(α,w ′,w)=
0.
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Proposition 5.12. δClsUpd does not satisfy weak inversity, strong inversity nor equi-distance.
Proof. Suppose the vocabulary has three atoms, the distance function is Hamming and δ is δrcp with η= 1. Assume
Mod(ψb) = {101,001,000} and 111,110,011,010  α and all other worlds do not model α. Finally, assume that ¦ is
defined such that Mod(ψb ¦α)= {111,011,010}. Note that Mod(ψb ¦α)⊆Mod(α).
Then d(010,000)= d(110,010)= 1, δClsUpd(α,010,000)= δrcp(α,010,000)= 1/2 and
δClsUpd(α,110,010)= 0. Therefore, d(010,000)≥ d(110,010), but δClsUpd(α,010,000) 6≤
δClsUpd(α,110,010). Hence, weak inversity fails for δClsUpd. This case also proves that equi-distance fails.
Due to strict inversity implying weak inversity, by contraposition, strict inversity fails.
Corollary 5.2. Because δClsUpd is not weakly inverse, it is not an inverse-distance weight function.
Proposition 5.13. δClsUpd is faithful iff δ is.
Proof. Assume w 6=w ′.
Assume δ is not faithful. Next, assume that w ∈Mod(ψb ¦α). It could thus happen that δ(α,w,w ′) = 1, implying
that δClsUpd is not faithful.
Now assume δ is faithful. Only the second and third lines are applicable. In both cases,
δClsUpd(α,w,w ′) < 1 (particularly, δ(α,w,w ′)< 1, because w 6=w ′).
5.4 Probabilistic Update with EDI Directly
Finally, we propose to use any relaxed (e-relaxed and n-e-relaxed) inverse-distance weight function for update. That
is, we propose that one may use operation EDIDctUpd for updating, such that it is relaxed and where δDctUpd is an
inverse-distance weight function.
Recall the example in Section 5.2, where b = 〈0.3,0.7,0,0〉, α=¬book, δDctRev is instantiated as δdfr and η= 0.1.
Notice that if an agent were to update its beliefs (〈0.3,0.7,0,0〉) with ¬book, the resulting belief state would be exactly
the same as for revision via EDIDctRev: 〈0,0,0.3¯,0.6¯〉. The reader may confirm that on the second application of
EDIDctRev, the agent still believes 〈0,0,0.3¯,0.6¯〉. On the second application of EDIDctUpd, however, the agent believes
〈0,0,0.45,0.55〉.
Each of strict inversity, equi-distance and faithfulness might be satisfied, depending on the particular instantiation
of δDctUpd.
6 Rationality Postulates for EDI
In this section, we present and propose rationality postulates – conditions which should be satisfied – for belief
revision and belief update. We do not claim that these are sufficient. Some of them are necessary, but some may not
be. Nonetheless, the postulates have been given due consideration. For this study, we identify three core (necessary)
rationality postulates for revision and update. We prove that EDIClsRev and EDIDctRev satisfy the three core revision
postulates, and that EDIClsUpd and EDIDctUpd satisfy the three core update postulates.
6.1 Probabilistic Revision Postulates
We adopt the rationality postulates for probabilistic belief revision from Gärdenfors (1988) and we employ probabilis-
tic versions of the rationality postulates for (non-probabilistic) belief update from Katsuno and Mendelzon (1992).
First, we discuss the operation called expansion, because it is mentioned in the postulates below. Conventionally,
(classical) expansion (denoted +) is the logical consequences of K ∪ {α}, where α is new information and K is the
current belief set. Or if the current beliefs can be captured as a single sentence β, expansion is defined simply as
β+α≡β∧α. We denote the expansion of belief state b with α as b+α .
(Unless stated otherwise, it is assumed that α is logically satisfiable.) The probabilistic belief revision postulates
(adapted from (Gärdenfors, 1988)) in our notation are
(P◦1) b◦α is a belief state
(P◦2) b◦α(α)= 1
(P◦3) If α≡β, then b◦α = b◦β
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(P◦4) If b(α)> 0, then b◦α = b+α
(P◦5) If b◦α(β)> 0, then b◦α∧β = (b◦α)+β
We take P◦1 - P◦3 to be self explanatory, and to be the three core postulates. P◦4 is an interpretation of the AGM pos-
tulate which says that if the evidence is consistent with the currently held beliefs, then revision amounts to expansion.
P◦5 says that if β is deemed possible in the belief state revised with α, then expanding the revised belief state with
β should be equal to revising the original belief state with the conjunction of α and β.
We propose adding this postulate:
(P◦6) If β |=α, then b◦α(β)≥ b(β)
P◦6 says that the belief in an α-world cannot decrease due to the reception of information that α.
Recall that
δClsRev(α,w,w ′) :=

1 if w =w ′
δ(α,w,w ′) if w ∈Mod(ψb ◦α)
0 otherwise,
where ◦ is some (acceptable) revision operator and δ is a non-evidence relaxed and retentive inverse-distance weight
function.
Proposition 6.1. (P◦1) is satisfied for EDIClsRev.
Proof. Due to normalization (via γ) in the definition of EDI (Def. 4.2), b◦α is a belief state whenever there exists at
least one world w ∈W s.t. if w  α, then ∑w ′∈W b(w ′)δClsRev(α,w,w ′) > 0. Assume that w  α. It must be shown
that there exists at least one world w ′ for which b(w ′)> 0 and δClsRev(α,w,w ′)> 0.
Proof by contradiction: Let w be an arbitrary world in W . (Main assumption) Assume there exists no world w ′ for
which b(w ′)> 0 and δClsRev(α,w,w ′)> 0. Assume w =w ′. Then the first line of the definition of δClsRev is applicable
and it must be that b(w ′)= 0. But this is impossible because it implies that for all worlds w , b(w)= 0 (b is implicitly
assumed to be well-defined). Therefore, it must be that w 6=w ′.
Let w ∈Mod(ψb ◦α) (there must exists at least one such w). Then the second line is applicable. Let b(w ′) > 0
(there must exist at least on such w ′). This implies that δClsRev(α,w,w ′)= 0, which implies that δ(α,w,w ′)= 0. Now,
either w ′ α or w ′ 6α.
Assume w ′  α. Recall that b(w ′) > 0. Note that the first line will eventually become applicable, making
δClsRev(α,w ′,w ′) = 1 and contradicting the main assumption. Therefore, it must be the case that w ′ 6 α. Recall
that δ is n-e-relaxed, that is, ∀w,w ′ ∈W , if w  α and w ′ 6 α, then δ(α,w,w ′) 6= 0. This also contradicts the main
assumption.
There is no other way to satisfy the main assumption. It must thus be the case that there exists some world w ′
for which b(w ′) > 0 and δClsRev(α,w,w ′) > 0, implying that there exists at least one world w ∈W s.t. if w  α, then∑
w ′∈W b(w ′)δClsRev(α,w,w ′)> 0.
Proposition 6.2. (P◦2) is satisfied for EDIClsRev.
Proof. The proposition is satisfied when bEDI
ClsRev
α (α)= 1. It is almost a direct consequence of the definition of EDI:
∀w ∈W , bEDIClsRevα (w)> 0 only if w α.
Proposition 6.3. (P◦3) is satisfied for EDIClsRev.
Proof. If α≡β, then ∀w ∈W , w α iff w β and bEDIClsRevα (w)= bEDI
ClsRev
β
(w), implying that bEDI
ClsRev
α = bEDI
ClsRev
β
.
Recall that
δDctRev(α,w,w ′) :=
{
δBC(w,w ′) if b(α)> 0
δ=0(α,w,w ′) otherwise
where δ is a non-evidence relaxed and an inverse-distance weight function.
Proposition 6.4. (P◦1) is satisfied for EDIDctRev.
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Proof. Due to normalization (via γ) in the definition of EDI (Def. 4.2), b◦α is a belief state whenever there exists at
least one world w ∈W s.t. if w  α, then ∑w ′∈W b(w ′)δDctRev(α,w,w ′) > 0. Assume that w  α. It must be shown
that there exists at least one world w ′ for which b(w ′)> 0 and δDctRev(α,w,w ′)> 0.
Proof by contradiction: Let w be an arbitrary world in W . (Main assumption) Assume there exists no world w ′
for which b(w ′)> 0 and δDctRev(α,w,w ′)> 0.
Either b(α)= 0 or b(α)> 0. Assume b(α)> 0. Then there exists at least one α-world with probability greater than
zero. Let w be that world. Thus, when w =w ′, δDctRev(α,w,w ′)= 1 (first line of definition) and the main assumption
fails in this case. Assume b(α)= 0. Then there exists at least one non-α-world with probability greater than zero. Let
w ′ be that world. Hence, the first and second lines are inapplicable, because “w,w ′ α if b(α)= 0” fails. Therefore,
only the third line is applicable. δ is n-e-relaxed, so ∀w,w ′ ∈W , if w  α and w ′ 6 α, then δ(α,w,w ′) 6= 0. By the
main assumption, this implies that for all worlds w ′, b(w) = 0. But this contradicts our deduction that there exists
some w ′ for which b(w ′)> 0.
There is no other way to satisfy the main assumption. It must thus be the case that there exists some world w ′
for which b(w ′)> 0 and δDctRev(α,w,w ′)> 0, implying that there exists at least one world w ∈W s.t. if w  α, then∑
w ′∈W b(w ′)δDctRev(α,w,w ′)> 0.
Proposition 6.5. (P◦2) is satisfied for EDIDctRev.
Proof. The proposition is satisfied when bEDI
DctRev
α (α)= 1. It is almost a direct consequence of the definition of EDI:
∀w ∈W , bEDIDctRevα (w)> 0 only if w α.
Proposition 6.6. (P◦3) is satisfied for EDIDctRev.
Proof. If α≡β, then ∀w ∈W , w α iff w β and bEDIDctRevα (w)= bEDI
DctRev
β
(w), implying that bEDI
DctRev
α = bEDI
DctRev
β
.
6.2 Probabilistic Update Postulates
A set of probabilistic belief update postulates is now adapted from (Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1992)’s classical postu-
lates. Each classical postulate is translated into probabilistic counterpart (in our notation).
(U1) β¦α |=α
(P¦1) b¦α(α)= 1
(U2) if β |=α, then β¦α≡β
(P¦2a) if b(α)= 1, then b¦α = b
(P¦2b) if φ |=α, b(φ)> 0 iff b¦α(φ)> 0
(P¦2c) if φ |=α, then if b(φ)> 0, then b¦α(φ)> 0
It is arguable which of P¦2a, P¦2b or P¦2c are appropriate translations ofU2 (if any). P¦2a is perhaps too strong and
P¦2c perhaps too weak. If P¦2b is taken to be an appropriate translation, then we argue that in a probabilistic setting,
it is too strong. For instance, it implies that if b(φ)= 0, then b¦α(φ)= 0, but this is not the case when ¦ is e-relaxed.
(U3) if both β and α are satisfiable, then β¦α is also satisfiable
(P¦3) b¦α is a belief state
P¦3 has the simpler form because α is assumed satisfiable and b is assumed to be a belief state.
(U4) if β1 ≡β2 and α1 ≡α2, then β1 ¦α1 ≡β2 ¦α2
(P¦4) if α1 ≡α2, then b¦α1 = b¦α2
(U5) (β¦α)∧φ |=β¦ (α∧φ)
(P¦5) if α∧φ is satisfiable and ψ |=φ, then:
b¦α∧φ(ψ)≥ b¦α(ψ)
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Suppose κ is a knowledge base and κ∧α′ implies κ∧β′. Then in terms of probabilities, one should expect b(β′)≥ b(α′),
where b is the ‘knowledge base’. Given this metaphor, one can derive from U5 the translation ‘if α∧φ is satisfiable,
then for all w ∈W , if w φ, then b¦α∧φ(w)≥ b¦α(w), of which P¦5 is the sentential version.
(U6) if β¦α1 |=α2 and β¦α2 |=α1, then:
β¦α1 ≡β¦α2
(P¦6a) if b¦α1 (α2)= 1 and b¦α2 (α1)= 1, then:
b¦α1 = b¦α2
(P¦6b) if b¦α1 (α2)= 1 and b¦α2 (α1)= 1, then:
b¦α1 (φ)> 0 ⇐⇒ b¦α2 (φ)> 0
P¦6b is weaker than P¦6a but arguably more reasonable/rational in a probabilistic setting.
(U7) if β is complete, then:
β¦α1∧β¦α2 |=β¦ (α1∨α2)
(P¦7) if there exists a w s.t. b(w)= 1, then:
min{b¦α1 (φ),b
¦
α2
(φ)}≤ b¦α1∨α2 (φ)≤ b¦α1 (φ)+b¦α2 (φ)
KM’s justification for U7 is “If some possible world results from updating a complete KB with µ1 and it also results
from updating it with µ2, then this possible world must also result from updating the KB with µ1∨µ2”. However, we
go a step farther (given a probabilistic setting), and say that the belief in any β given complete belief state resulting
from updating with µ1∨µ2 should be no less than the least of the beliefs in β after updating the belief state with µ1
and updating it with µ2 separately, and no more than the sum of the belief in β after updating the belief state with µ1
and updating it with µ2 separately.
(U8) (β1∨β2)¦α≡ (β1 ¦α)∨ (β2 ¦α)
At this time, we do not have a satisfactory translation for U8.
P¦1, P¦3 and P¦4 are taken to be the three core postulates.
Recall that
δClsUpd(α,w,w ′) :=

1 if w =w ′
δ(α,w,w ′) if w ∈Mod(ψb ¦α)
0 otherwise,
where ¦ is some (acceptable) update operator and δ is a relaxed inverse-distance weight function.
Proposition 6.7. (P¦1) is satisfied for EDIClsUpd.
Proof. The proposition is satisfied when bEDI
ClsUpd
α (α)= 1. It is almost a direct consequence of the definition of EDI:
∀w ∈W , bEDIClsUpdα (w)> 0 only if w α.
Proposition 6.8. (P¦3) is satisfied for EDIClsUpd.
Proof. We must prove that bEDI
ClsUpd
α is a belief state. Due to normalization (via γ) in the definition of EDI (Def. 4.2),
bEDI
ClsUpd
α is a belief state whenever there exists at least one world w ∈W s.t. if w α, then
∑
w ′∈W b(w ′)δClsUpd(α,w,w ′)>
0. Assume that w α. It must be shown that there exists at least one world w ′ for which b(w ′)> 0 and δClsUpd(α,w,w ′)>
0.
Proof by contradiction: Let w be an arbitrary world in W . (Main assumption) Assume there exists no world w ′ for
which b(w ′)> 0 and δClsUpd(α,w,w ′)> 0. Assume w =w ′. Then the first line of the definition of δClsUpd is applicable
and it must be that b(w ′)= 0. But this is impossible because it implies that for all worlds w , b(w)= 0 (b is implicitly
assumed to be well-defined). Therefore, it must be that w 6=w ′.
Let w ∈Mod(ψb ¦α) (there must exists at least one such w). Then the second line is applicable. Let b(w ′) > 0
(there must exist at least on such w ′). This implies that δClsUpd(α,w,w ′)= 0, which implies that δ(α,w,w ′)= 0. Now,
either w ′ α or w ′ 6α.
Assume w ′  α. Recall that b(w ′) > 0. Note that the first line will eventually become applicable, making
δClsUpd(α,w ′,w ′) = 1 and contradicting the main assumption. Therefore, it must be the case that w ′ 6 α. Recall
19
that δ is relaxed and thus n-e-relaxed – that is, ∀w,w ′ ∈W , if w  α and w ′ 6 α, then δ(α,w,w ′) 6= 0. This also
contradicts the main assumption.
There is no other way to satisfy the main assumption. It must thus be the case that there exists some world w ′
for which b(w ′)> 0 and δClsUpd(α,w,w ′)> 0, implying that there exists at least one world w ∈W s.t. if w  α, then∑
w ′∈W b(w ′)δClsUpd(α,w,w ′)> 0.
Proposition 6.9. (P¦4) is satisfied for EDIClsUpd.
Proof. If α ≡ β, then ∀w ∈ W , w  α iff w  β and bEDIClsUpdα (w) = bEDI
ClsUpd
β
(w), implying that bEDI
ClsUpd
α =
bEDI
ClsUpd
β
.
Recall that δDctUpd is a relaxed inverse-distance weight function.
Proposition 6.10. (P¦1) is satisfied for EDIDctUpd.
Proof. The proposition is satisfied when bEDI
DctUpd
α (α)= 1. It is almost a direct consequence of the definition of EDI:
∀w ∈W , bEDIDctUpdα (w)> 0 only if w α.
Proposition 6.11. (P¦3) is satisfied for EDIDctUpd.
Proof. We must prove that bEDI
DctUpd
α is a belief state. Due to normalization (via γ) in the definition of EDI (Def. 4.2),
bEDI
DctUpd
α is a belief state whenever there exists at least one world w ∈W s.t. if w α, then
∑
w ′∈W b(w ′)δDctUpd(α,w,w ′)>
0. Assume that w α. It must be shown that there exists at least one world w ′ for which b(w ′)> 0 and δDctUpd(α,w,w ′)>
0.
Let b(w ′)> 0 (there must exist at least one such). By relaxation, δDctUpd(α,w,w ′)> 0.
Proposition 6.12. (P¦4) is satisfied for EDIDctUpd.
Proof. If α ≡ β, then ∀w ∈ W , w  α iff w  β and bEDIDctUpdα (w) = bEDI
DctUpd
β
(w), implying that bEDI
DctUpd
α =
bEDI
DctUpd
β
.
7 Conclusion
We have proposed probabilistic belief revision and belief update operators, both within an imaging framework. The
role of a weight function – usually expected to be inversely proportional to the ’distance’ between worlds – is central to
the Expected Distance Imaging (EDI) framework. In this paper, we have only begun the investigation into the behavior
or properties of various instantiations of a general form of imaging. There is still much work to be done. For instance,
what is the effect of retention versus relaxation and when is one more appropriate than the other? We have worked
with the hypothesis that retention relates to revision and that relaxation relates to update, but to what degree is this
hypothesis true? What is the meaning of the effect of the size of η in δrcp and δdfr?
We would like to make a deeper study of the probabilistic rationality postulates, especially those for update (as they
have not been given much attention in the literature). We would then like to test various EDI instantiations against the
postulates and use the results to perhaps design new EDI operators. We hope that these insights might lead to further
insights in order to better understand the relationship between revision and update, whether classical or not.
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